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INTRODUCTION 
Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,1 
federal district courts have the discretion to decide “jurisdictional 
facts.”2  Jurisdictional facts are facts that are alleged and ultimately 
proven to establish subject matter jurisdiction in federal court.3  
Although jurisdictional facts are relevant in both § 1331 and § 1332 
determinations, the most typical jurisdictional facts involve diversity 
of citizenship which gives federal courts subject matter jurisdiction 
under United States Code § 1332.4  Thus, in a case where jurisdiction 
is based upon § 1332, the citizenship of the parties is a jurisdictional 
 
 ∗ J.D. candidate, May 2004, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2001, 
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 1 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (“Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in 
any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, shall 
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the 
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of 
jurisdiction over the subject matter . . . .”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d) (“The 
defenses specifically enumerated (1)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this rule, whether 
made in a pleading or by motion . . . shall be heard and determined before trial on 
application of any party, unless the court orders that the hearing and determination 
thereof be deferred until the trial.”). 
 2 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.30 [1], at 12-36 (3d 
ed. 1997). 
 3 Id. 
 4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2001) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States.”); see also § 1332(a) (2001) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . (1) citizens of different 
States . . . .”). 
Although a jurisdictional prerequisite, the amount in controversy requirement 
of § 1332 is generally treated as a merits-related determination because deciding 
whether the amount claimed exceeds the $75,000 threshold often requires reaching 
the merits of the case.  See 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1350, at 231 (2d ed. 1990); see also infra notes 140-43 and 
accompanying text; infra Part IV. 
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fact.5  Such a fact is not subject to a jury trial so courts often hold 
preliminary hearings to determine if the jurisdictional facts establish 
jurisdiction.6 
There is, however, an important exception to Rule 12(b)(1) that 
often arises when the jurisdiction is not based upon § 1332, but 
rather, upon § 1331:7  courts may not decide jurisdictional facts if 
such facts are intertwined with the merits of the case.8  This may seem 
like a straightforward proposition, but the exception is more 
complicated than might first appear.  Although jurisdictional facts 
alleging the diversity of citizenship requirement under § 1332 are 
easily separated from the merits of the claim, it is often harder to 
determine whether facts alleged in federal question cases are purely 
jurisdictional or intertwined with the merits.9  Further, the interplay 
between the rule and the exception has important implications for 
determining who, the court or the finder of fact, decides a number of 
critical questions under a variety of federal statutes.10 
A recent example of the complexity of the interplay between the 
rule and the exception is the decision by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Scarfo v. Ginsburg,11 a case with 
 
 5 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2001).  For example, diversity requires that if one 
party is a citizen of New York the other cannot be a citizen of New York.  Id. 
 6 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, at 12-36. 
 7 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2001) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States.”); see also 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, at 12-36 (“Subject matter jurisdiction 
in federal-question cases is sometimes erroneously conflated with a plaintiff’s need 
and ability to prove the defendant bound by the federal law asserted as the predicate 
for relief—a merits-related determination.”). 
While § 1331 is a major source of federal subject matter jurisdiction, it is 
possible that some statutes have their own specialized jurisdictional grants which may 
apply instead of or in addition to § 1331.  The analysis of jurisdictional facts and the 
“intertwined with merits” exception, however, does not change.  See infra notes 144-
48, 155 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV. 
 8 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1350, at 235 (“If, however, a decision of 
the jurisdictional issue requires a ruling on the merits of the case, the decision 
should await a determination of the merits either by the court on a summary 
judgment motion or by the fact finder at trial.”). 
 9 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, at 12-36. 
 10 See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2002); Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621(2002); Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601(2002); Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 215 (2002); Employee Retirement Income Securities Act 
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2002); Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 
U.S.C. § 651 (2002); Emergency Medical Treatment and Women in Active Labor Act 
(EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2002); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title 
VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2002). 
 11 175 F.3d 957 (11th Cir. 1999). 
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potentially great implications for both employment discrimination 
and § 1331 jurisprudence.  In Scarfo, the defendants moved for 
summary judgment arguing that there was no federal subject matter 
jurisdiction over Scarfo’s Title VII claims because none of the 
defendants were “employers” as defined by the statutory language.12  
Scarfo responded that whether the defendants were “employers” as 
defined by Title VII was not a purely jurisdictional fact for the court 
to decide, but rather, was a jurisdictional fact intertwined with the 
merits of the case and, thus, was for the jury to decide.13  In support 
of her argument, Scarfo cited to Garcia v. Copenhaver,14 in which the 
Eleventh Circuit held that, for purposes of determining subject 
matter jurisdiction, whether a plaintiff was an “employer” or an 
“independent contractor” under the ADEA was intertwined with the 
merits of the plaintiff’s claim.15  The majority in Scarfo, however, did 
not apply the “intertwined with the merits” exception as Garcia had; 
instead, it dismissed Scarfo’s claims for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.16 
Scarfo and Garcia illustrate the courts’ lack of uniformity in 
applying the “intertwined with the merits” test.  Given the general 
availability of jury trials under the antidiscrimination statutes,17 the 
threshold question of whether a defendant is an “employer” is often 
 
 12 Id. at 959. 
 13 Id. 
 14 104 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 15 Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 961 n.1 (citing Garcia, 104 F.3d at 1267). 
 16 Id. at 961. 
Also illustrating the complexities of Rule 12(b)(1) and the “intertwined with the 
merits” exception, the Eleventh Circuit recently decided Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 
F.3d 920, 929-30 (11th Cir. 2003), holding a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal inappropriate 
because the question of eligible-employee status “implicated both jurisdiction and 
the underlying merits of Appellant’s FMLA claim.”  Id. at 930.  The court noted that 
an intra-circuit split existed on the issue of whether eligible-employee status was 
jurisdictional or whether it implicated the merits of the case.  Id. at 929 (citing to 
Scarfo, 175 F.3d 957 (holding that the issue was jurisdictional) and Garcia v. 
Copenhaver, 104 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding the issue to be merits-
related)).  Although the court followed the appropriate procedure in such a 
situation—the “earliest case rule”—and applied Garcia, the court also stated that it 
believed Garcia, and not Scarfo, to “correctly state the law . . . .”  Id. at 929. 
 17 Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978), first established the right to a jury trial 
under the ADEA.  Id.  It was generally believed that there was no right to a jury trial 
under Title VII until the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was adopted.  See Curtis v. Loether, 
415 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1974) (stating that “jury trial is not required in an action for 
reinstatement and backpay”); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (5th 
Cir. 1971) (stating that the demand for backpay under Title VII is to be determined 
through the exercise of the court’s discretion).  The Civil Rights Act of 1991 
recognized the right to a jury trial in both Title VII and the ADA cases.  See Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(c), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
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critical.18  Whether judge or jury decides the facts in question will 
frequently determine the outcome of the case.19  For example, a jury 
might be expected to be more sympathetic to the plaintiff on close 
calls, especially with facts as egregious as those in Scarfo.20 
This Comment analyzes the application of Rule 12(b)(1) to the 
jurisdictional fact question and the appropriateness and limitation of 
the “intertwined with the merits” exception.  Part I of this Comment 
reviews the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Scarfo and sketches its broad 
implications.21  Part II then discusses the rule and its exception, with 
II.A summarizing the general application of Rule 12(b)(1), II.B. 
examining the development of the “intertwined with the merits” 
exception, and II.C. analyzing the application of the exception.  Part 
III of this Comment introduces the right to a jury trial by explaining 
the significance of the constitutional right to a jury trial, and 
examining that right in the context of Title VII.  In addition, Part III 
discusses the problems associated with the application of Rule 
12(b)(1) as they emerge in Scarfo.22  Finally, Part IV proposes a 
solution which would create uniformity and fairness to plaintiffs in 
the application of the “intertwined with the merits” exception.  This 
solution asks courts to consider whether the fact allegedly 
establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction would also apply if the 
case were filed in state court. 
 
 18 In order to establish a cause of action under the antidiscrimination statutes, 
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant meets the requisite definition of an 
“employer” under the statute.  See Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., 519 U.S. 202 
(1997) (noting that hourly and part-time employees count for purposes of 
determining whether entity is an “employer” under Title VII); Ost v. West Suburban 
Travelers Limousine, Inc., 88 F.3d 435 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that independent 
contractors do not count for purposes of determining whether entity is an 
“employer” under the statute).  This is a fact-sensitive and merits-related 
determination that the jury, as the trier of fact, should decide.  See infra notes 29-34 
and accompanying text. 
 19 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: 
Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124 (1992) (comparing the outcomes 
of jury trials and judge trials). 
 20 See infra Part I.  Compare Romano v. U-Haul Int’l, 233 F.3d 655 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(upholding jury verdict for plaintiff on her sex discrimination claim; the jury, using 
the integrated-enterprise test to determine whether two entities could be sued as a 
“single-employer” under Title VII, held that parent corporation was plaintiff’s 
employer for purposes of the statute), with Scarfo v. Ginsburg, 175 F.3d 957 (11th 
Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction because defendant did not meet the requisite definition of 
“employer” for purposes of Title VII; case did not get to a jury because the court 
summarily decided the issue). 
 21 See infra Part I. 
 22 See infra Part III. 
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I.  SCARFO AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
As discussed earlier, Scarfo v. Ginsburg23 is a recent example of the 
complex nature of Rule 12(b)(1) and the “intertwined with the 
merits” exception.24  Victor Ginsburg owned several corporations, 
three of which allegedly employed plaintiff Elaine Scarfo as a 
secretary and receptionist.25  Scarfo filed a complaint alleging sexual 
harassment and employment discrimination against Ginsburg and 
the three corporations.26  She alleged that Ginsburg subjected her to 
unwanted sexually offensive conduct during the time she was 
employed and then terminated her after she complained.27  All of the 
defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the district 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Scarfo’s Title VII claims 
because none of the defendants was an employer within the meaning 
of Title VII.28 
An employer under Title VII, is “a person engaged in an industry 
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each 
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current 
or preceding calendar year . . . .”29  While none of Ginsburg’s 
corporations separately employed fifteen or more employees for the 
requisite time, Scarfo alleged that “two or more of the above 
corporations combined constituted her employer for Title VII 
purposes.”30  Even though Title VII permits aggregation of entities to 
determine coverage,31 the district court concluded, after an 
evidentiary hearing held by the magistrate judge, that the three 
defendant corporations could not be aggregated.32  According to the 
 
 23 175 F.3d 957 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 24 See 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, at 12-37-12-38 (stating that a Rule 12(b)(1) 
dismissal is improper where “the jurisdictional facts are too intertwined with the 
merits to permit the determination [of subject matter jurisdiction] to be made 
independently [of the merits of the case].”). 
 25 Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 958-59. 
 26 Id. at 959. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2002). 
 30 Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 958-59. 
 31 See EEOC v. McLemore Food Stores, Inc., No. C-77-2148, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
13741, at *8 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 1977) (holding that three defendant corporations 
were to be regarded as a single employer for purposes of Title VII) (citing Williams v. 
New Orleans S.S. Ass’n, 341 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. La. 1972) (finding that the single 
employer theory that had been applied under the National Labor Relations Act 
could be applied in EEOC cases as well), and EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel 
Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1974) (noting a close relationship between 
the National Labor Relations Act and Title VII)). 
 32 Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 959. 
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district court, one of the corporations was not sufficiently integrated 
in its operations with the others for all three to be treated as a single 
employer.33  As a result, the court applied a summary judgment 
standard and dismissed Scarfo’s Title VII claims after determining 
that no genuine issue of material fact existed.34 
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, Scarfo argued that, because 
the determination of whether an entity constituted an “employer” 
under Title VII was an element of her cause of action, the district 
court erred in dismissing the case.35  She claimed that the 
determination of “employer” status should have been made by the 
jury, which would have heard the rest of her case.36  Thus, without 
classifying it as such, Scarfo was arguing the “intertwined with the 
merits” exception to the jurisdictional fact doctrine.37 
Scarfo argued that under controlling circuit court authority, the 
jury, not the court, should act as fact-finder in determining the 
“single employer” issue for Title VII purposes.38  In Garcia v. 
Copenhaver,39 the Eleventh Circuit had held that, for purposes of 
determining subject matter jurisdiction, whether a plaintiff was an 
“employee” or an “independent contractor” under the ADEA was an 
element of the plaintiff’s claim; as such, any facts material to that 
determination were for the jury, not the court, to decide.40  The Scarfo 
majority disagreed holding that whether a defendant constituted an 
“employer” was a jurisdictional fact not intertwined with the merits.41  
In distinguishing the two cases, the Scarfo court noted that in Garcia it 
was clear that the employer was subject to Title VII while in Scarfo, the 
question was whether the employer was subject to Title VII.42  Any 
issues of material fact in Garcia, therefore, had to go to the jury.43  In 
 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 958. 
 36 Id. at 961. 
 37 See 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1350. 
 38 Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 961. 
 39 104 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 40 Id. at 1265 n.9. 
 41 Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 961. 
 42 Id.  The Scarfo court essentially argued that in Garcia, the employer was subject 
to the ADEA no matter what—the issue was whether an individual was an employee 
or an independent contractor.  Id.  In contrast, the very issue to be decided in Scarfo 
was whether the employer was subject to Title VII at all.  Id.  This distinction is 
unpersuasive, however, because the question of who is an “employer” necessarily 
requires a determination of who is an “employee.”  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) 
(2002).  Thus, the questions being asked in both cases should be treated in the same 
manner—as elements of the plaintiff’s claim. 
 43 Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 961 (citing Garcia, 104 F.3d at 1265 n.9). 
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contrast, the Scarfo court held that the defendants’ “status as 
‘employers’ [did not] implicate an element of the Title VII cause of 
action.”44  Whether the appellees met the statutory definition of 
“employer” for Title VII purposes was a “threshold jurisdictional 
issue” because, if the employer did not meet the requirements set 
forth in the statute, “Title VII [was] inapplicable, and the district 
court lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction over Scarfo’s claims.”45  In 
Scarfo, the question was whether certain entities could be aggregated 
to form a single “employer” under Title VII.46  The court saw this as a 
purely jurisdictional question to be decided solely by the court 
because Title VII is “inapplicable” if there is not an “employer” as 
defined by the statute.47  Accordingly, the case was dismissed for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction after the court found no Title VII 
“employer.”48 
At first blush, Scarfo appears to be a narrow opinion; indeed, if it 
is applied only to “aggregation of employer” claims, perhaps it is 
narrow.  But any question of fact relating to who is an “employer” 
under a myriad of federal statutes may fall within the Scarfo court’s 
view of jurisdictional facts.49  For example, in order to be covered 
under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the defendant must be an “employer.”50  
The plaintiff has the burden of establishing this as part of her cause 
of action.51  In addition to these statutes, plaintiffs filing claims under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), Employee Retirement Income 
Securities Act (ERISA), and Occupational Safety and Health Act 
 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id.  Since the district court had applied the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s 
standard for summary judgment in its finding that there was not sufficient 
integration, the jury would never have reached the question even if it was not a 
purely jurisdictional fact.  Id. at 960.  Therefore, the Court of Appeals could have 
simply affirmed the decision of the district court had the summary judgment 
standard been correctly applied by the trial court.  Id.  The Court of Appeals, 
however, reached out to decide the case and proceeded to incorrectly apply the 
“intertwined with the merits” exception to Rule 12(b)(1).  See, e.g., Scarfo, 175 F.3d 
957. 
 46 Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 959-60. 
 47 Id. at 961. 
 48 Id. at 959. 
 49 See infra Part II.C. 
 50 ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2002); ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2002); FMLA, 
29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A) (2002). 
 51 See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 337 (John William 
Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). 
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(OSHA) must also prove that they are suing an “employer.”52  Each of 
these federal statutes defines “employer” in terms similar or identical 
to Title VII,53 and, applying the rationale of Scarfo, any questions 
surrounding those definitions are jurisdictional ones for the court to 
decide.  If questions of fact concerning whether the entity meets the 
requisite definition of “employer” under any of these statutes fall 
within Scarfo’s definition of jurisdictional facts, then the issue of who 
is covered by the law will almost always be decided by the court, not 
the jury.54 
Moreover, although the parties in Scarfo litigated the question of 
whether entities could be aggregated to constitute an “employer” 
under Title VII,55 the statutory definition of “employer” under Title 
VII and the other antidiscrimination statutes more often turns on 
who counts as an “employee.”56  Since an “employer” employs 
“employees,” if individuals who work for the defendant are not 
“employees,” or if there are an insufficient number of “employees,” 
the defendant will not be an “employer.”  Further, even if a 
defendant does employ the requisite number of “employees,” the 
plaintiff herself must still be an “employee” in order to sue.57  Under 
 
 52 See FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 215 (2002); ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2002); OSHA, 29 
U.S.C. § 651 (2002). 
 53 The ADA defines “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting 
commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or 
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar years, and any agent of 
such person . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2002).  The ADEA defines “employer” as “a 
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more 
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the 
current or preceding calendar year . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2002).  Under the 
FMLA, “employer” is defined as “any person engaged in commerce or in an industry 
or activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees for each working 
day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding 
calendar year . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A) (2002).  Title VII defines “employer” as 
“a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more 
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the 
current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e(b) (2002). 
 54 See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. 
 55 See Scarfo, 175 F.3d 957. 
 56 See, e.g., Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996) (concluding 
that plaintiff was an “employee,” not a “partner,” for purposes of the ADEA); EEOC 
v. North Knox Sch. Corp., 154 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that “independent 
contractors” are not employees and therefore not protected by the ADEA). 
 57 Note that whether the defendant is an “employer” and whether the plaintiff is 
an “employee” under Title VII are treated as two different questions even though 
perhaps they should not be.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2002).  Whether a cause 
of action exists is a different question from whether the cause of action will succeed. 
Over the years, the Supreme Court has had the opportunity to decide who 
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Scarfo, whether the plaintiff is an employee, as opposed, say, to an 
independent contractor or a partner, would seem to also go to the 
jurisdiction of the court. 
Additionally, beyond the question of whether the defendant is 
an “employer” in terms of the number of “employees,” the 
antidiscrimination statutes also impose a commerce requirement for 
employers.58  With the Supreme Court’s new-found restrictions on 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, there may be 
problems with whether a particular entity is engaged “in an industry 
affecting commerce,”59 which all the statutes include in the definition 
of an employer.60  While the courts obviously decide the legal issues 
involved in such situations, Scarfo raises new questions about who 
decides the facts when disputes related to an “employer” are 
concerned.  For instance, if courts were to follow Scarfo, any questions 
of fact surrounding whether an industry or activity affects commerce 
would be for the judge to decide.61  Under Scarfo, courts would not 
 
counts as an employee in various contexts.  See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 
U.S. 69 (1984) (holding that plaintiff, an associate at the firm, was an employee; it 
followed that the opportunity for partnership was also part of her employment); 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992) (holding that independent 
contractors are not employees under ERISA).  The Court has also decided disputes 
about computing the number of employees.  See, e.g., Walters, 519 U.S. 202 (holding 
that if employees were “on the payroll” during any given period, they could be 
counted for purposes of the antidiscrimination statutes, regardless of whether or not 
they were actually at work on any given day). 
 58 ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2002); ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2002); FMLA, 
29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A) (2002); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2002). 
 59 For a particular entity to engage “in an industry affecting commerce,” the 
entity must have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  See Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 379 U.S. 
294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).  Compare Johnson v. 
Alternatives, Inc., 2002 WL 1949738, *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2002) (holding that the 
purchase of a computer and $519 in long-distance telephone calls were not enough 
to qualify as a substantial effect on interstate commerce); Graves v. Methodist Youth 
Servs., 624 F. Supp. 429 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (holding that long-distance phone charges of 
$175 and the purchase of office supplies from nationally recognized entities were 
insubstantial and did not amount to a substantial effect on interstate commerce), and 
Vasquez v. Visions, Inc., 2002 WL 91905, *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2002) (holding that 
long-distance phone charges and the purchase of membership for out-of-state 
organizations amounting to $7,256 were not substantial enough to effect interstate 
commerce), with EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1975) 
(noting that extensive out-of-state expenses totaling more than $10,000 have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce). 
 60 ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2002); ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2002); FMLA, 
29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A) (2002); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2002). 
 61 See Scarfo, 175 F.3d 957.  Note that should we go down this road, the doctrine 
of “constitutional facts” may apply.  See, e.g.,  Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 
U.S. 485 (1984). 
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treat such questions of fact as being “intertwined with the merits” of 
the claim because, if the definition of “employer” is not met, the 
federal statute is inapplicable.62  Thus, the court would say such 
questions are merely jurisdictional and will leave them for the judge 
to decide.63  The result of this reasoning is that any plaintiff who sues 
under a federal statute will be subject to the court’s determination of 
jurisidictional facts as purely jurisdictional, regardless of whether 
such facts also go to the merits of the cause of action. 
Furthermore, while the determination of who constitutes an 
“employer” under the relevant statutes is subject to the logic of Scarfo, 
that logic is not limited to the employment realm.  Federal statutes 
creating private causes of action in a broad panoply of situations can 
be brought within Scarfo’s reach.64  Even more important, whether 
Rule 12(b)(1) permits a trial court to decide whether a defendant is 
an entity engaged in commerce could have implications for a wide 
variety of federal statutes beyond the employment context.  The 
application of a variety of federal laws could be recast in terms of 
federal jurisdiction.  To take an extreme example, the Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Women in Active Labor Act (EMTALA)65 
requires hospitals to provide “an appropriate medical screening 
examination” to those coming to the emergency room to determine 
if they have an “emergency medical condition.”66  If the screening 
reveals such a condition, the hospital must then stabilize the patient’s 
condition before she can be transferred or discharged.67  Any 
disputed facts surrounding whether a plaintiff was appropriately 
screened in the emergency room or whether she was released before 
being stabilized are not purely jurisdictional but are merits-related 
because they require an examination of the plaintiff’s case.68  Under 
the logic of Scarfo, however, such facts will be treated as jurisdictional 
facts for the judge alone to decide. 
 
 62 Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 961. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. 
 65 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2002). 
 66 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (a). 
 67 Id. 
 68 See Bloomer v. Norman Reg’l Hosp., No. 99-6074, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 16099, 
*5-7 (10th Cir. July 12, 2000) (noting that the district court should not have decided 
the case on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, but rather, the court should have used a merits-
based motion because the facts relating to whether the patient was appropriately 
screened and whether the patient’s condition was properly stabilized were not purely 
jurisdictional but merits-related). 
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II.  JURISDICTIONAL FACTS 
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss challenges the federal court’s 
subject matter jurisdiction.69  Because a federal court typically decides 
questions of subject matter jurisdiction before reaching the merits of 
the case, the court “may hear evidence and make findings of fact 
necessary to rule on the subject matter jurisdiction question before 
trial . . . .”70  These facts, which establish the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the federal court, are known as jurisdictional facts.71  It 
is well established that the court may decide jurisdictional facts if they 
are not intertwined with the merits of the case.72 
A.  The Application of Rule 12(b)(1) 
Rule 12(b)(1) challenges to subject matter jurisdiction come in 
two forms: facial and factual attacks.73  In a facial attack, it is the 
sufficiency of the pleading which is questioned, not the jurisdictional 
fact itself.74  Thus, the court accepts all allegations as true.75  In a 
factual attack, however, the court does not presume the allegations to 
be true because the jurisdictional facts themselves are challenged.76  
The court is thus free to consider evidence outside of the pleadings 
in an effort to satisfy itself as to the existence of subject matter 
jurisdiction because such a challenge involves the court’s actual 
power to hear the case.77 
There is little controversy over the general rule that, when faced 
with a factual attack upon subject matter jurisdiction, courts can 
decide jurisdictional facts.78  Rule 12(b)(1), read in conjunction with 
Rule 12(d), explicitly so provides79 and the federal courts of appeals 
 
 69 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1350, at 194. 
 70 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, at 12-37. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, at 12-39. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 12-41 (citing Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990), 
and Daniel v. Ferguson, 839 F.2d 1124, 1127 n.5 (5th Cir. 1988)); see, e.g., Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1992) (noting that jurisdictional facts 
need to be treated differently at different stages of the proceedings: plead them to 
meet a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, provide evidence from which the fact could be found 
to meet a Rule 56 motion, and prove them at trial). 
 78 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, at 12-36. 
 79 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d) (“The defenses specifically 
enumerated (1)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by 
motion . . . shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party, 
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have unanimously so held.80  In Williamson v. Tucker,81 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit made clear that the 
district court’s power to decide whether it has jurisdiction over a case 
is greater than the power it has when the merits of that same case are 
finally reached.82  The district court’s unique power to decide 
jurisdictional facts allows the court to hear conflicting evidence and 
decide for itself whether the requirements for jurisdiction are 
satisfied.83  More recently, in Valentin v. Hospital Bella Vista,84 the Fifth 
Circuit expressly stated that in resolving jurisdictional fact disputes, 
“the court enjoys broad authority to order discovery, consider 
extrinsic evidence, and hold evidentiary hearings in order to 
 
unless the court orders that the hearing and determination thereof be deferred until 
the trial.”). 
 80 See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., Inc., 419 U.S. 186 (1974); Valentin 
v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358 (1st  Cir. 2001); Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648 
(4th Cir. 1999); Lawrence, 919 F.2d 1525; Daniel, 839 F.2d 1124; Rosales v. United 
States, 824 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1987); Thigpen v. United States, 800 F.2d 393 (4th Cir. 
1986); Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1983); Williamson v. 
Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981); Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 
507 (5th Cir. 1980); Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. General Tel. & Elects Corp., 594 
F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1979); Berardinelli v. Castle & Cooke, Inc., 587 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 
1978); McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 583 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1978), 
vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 232 (1980); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884 (3d Cir. 1977); Exchange Nat’l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross 
& Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976); State of Alabama ex rel. Baxley v. Woody, 473 
F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1973); Rosemound Sand & Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand & Gravel 
Co., 469 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 81 Williamson, 645 F.2d 404.  In Williamson, the issue was whether joint venture 
interests were “securities” within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Id. at 406.  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit held that even though the district court enjoys a broad power to 
decide jurisdictional facts, that power does not extend to situations in which such 
facts are intertwined with the merits of the federal cause of action.  Id. at 416.  
According to the Court of Appeals, the claim that the joint venture interests were 
“securities” within the meaning of the federal securities acts was not “so immaterial 
or insubstantial as to warrant dismissal . . . for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”  Id.  
Rather, the claim was one in which the merits of the case were decidedly implicated; 
thus, the district court was not justified in dismissing the claim for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  Id. 
 82 Id. at 413. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Valentin, 254 F.3d 358.  In Valentin, a patient sued several Puerto Rican 
healthcare providers for medical malpractice.  Id. at 361.  She claimed that she was a 
citizen of Florida for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.  Id.  The United States District 
Court for the District of Puerto Rico dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Id. at 362. The patient appealed, and the First Circuit held that the 
district court was justified in its dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims because, where the 
jurisdictional fact is not intertwined with the merits of the case, the court is able to 
consider conflicting evidence and decide the fact in question.  Id. at 363. 
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determine its own jurisdiction.”85  The court explained: 
A court’s authority to hear a particular case is a necessary 
precondition to the proper performance of the judicial function.  
Thus, when a factbound jurisdictional question looms, a court 
must be allowed considerable leeway in weighing the proof, 
drawing reasonable inferences, and satisfying itself that subject-
matter jurisdiction has attached.86 
Courts, therefore, can decide jurisdictional facts because the very 
power of the court to issue a judgment depends on whether the court 
has jurisdiction over the matter.87 
Although there is not much disagreement over the general rule 
that courts can decide jurisdictional facts, there are many situations 
where the court must look to the merits of the case in order to decide 
the jurisdictional fact question.88  In such situations, the right to 
decide jurisdictional facts comes squarely into conflict with another 
time-honored principle—the right of the plaintiff to a jury trial on 
the merits of his claim.  Accordingly, courts have fashioned an 
exception to the general rule that courts can decide jurisdictional 
facts: when jurisdictional facts are “intertwined with the merits” of the 
cause of action, the general rule no longer applies.89 
B.  The Development of the “Intertwined With the Merits” Exception to 
Rule 12(b)(1) 
The exception at issue in Scarfo, that jurisdictional facts cannot 
be decided by the court when they are “intertwined with the merits,” 
can be traced back to the late 1800s.90  Two early Supreme Court 
cases, decided well before the adoption of the federal rules, 
suggested that a court could not usurp the role of the jury and decide 
the merits of a case under the rubric of determining jurisdiction.91  
After the adoption of the federal rules, the Supreme Court, in Land 
v. Dollar,92 reinforced its earlier decisions implying that a court, under 
the guise of determining jurisdiction, cannot assume the function of 
the jury.93  In a fourth case, Bell v. Hood,94 the Supreme Court 
 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 364. 
 87 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, at 12-36. 
 88 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1350, at 235. 
 89 Id. 
 90 See infra notes 91-95. 
 91 See Smithers v. Smith, 204 U.S. 632, 645 (1907); Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 
550, 565 (1886). 
 92 330 U.S. 731 (1947). 
 93 Id. at 735, 739. 
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discussed the scope of the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal 
courts in terms broad enough to suggest that the courts should be 
mindful of their use of Rule 12(b)(1) in federal question cases.95  
These four Supreme Court decisions form the basis of the federal 
courts of appeals’ later development of the “intertwined with the 
merits” exception. 
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
1938,96  the Court decided Barry v. Edmunds97 and Smithers v. Smith.98  
Barry, the earliest Supreme Court opinion, stated that “[i]n no case is 
it permissible for the court to substitute itself for the jury . . . .”99  Barry 
was a tort action where the amount of recoverable damages was not 
fixed by law; one question, therefore, was whether the complaint met 
the jurisdictional amount in controversy requirement.100  The Court 
recognized the important role played by the jury.101  Emphasizing that 
it is the jury’s role to decide such issues of fact, the Court held that 
the jury’s verdict will stand unless tainted by gross error.102  The Court 
also stated that the jury cannot be compelled to comply with a court’s 
view of facts in evidence.103 
Smithers expanded on Barry’s holding, making clear that a trial 
court’s authority to dismiss an action is “not unlimited.”104  
Specifically, the court’s “limits ought to be ascertained and observed, 
lest under the guise of determining jurisdiction the merits of the 
controversy between the parties be summarily decided without the 
ordinary incidents of trial, including the right to a jury.”105  In 
Smithers, plaintiff landowner brought an action against defendants 
claiming that defendants took his land from him.106  Plaintiff alleged 
that jurisdiction existed based on diversity of citizenship and amount 
in controversy.107  The court of appeals, however, determined that the 
 
 94 327 U.S. 678 (1946). 
 95 Id. at 680-83. 
 96 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1004, at 28 (3d ed. 2002) (noting that the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure became effective on September 16, 1938). 
 97 Barry, 116 U.S. 550. 
 98 Smithers, 204 U.S. 632. 
 99 Barry, 116 U.S. at 565. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Smithers, 204 U.S. at 645. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 639-40. 
 107 Id. 
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land taken and held by each defendant was worth less than $2,000 
and dismissed the case.108  This, the Court held, addressed an element 
of the merits rather than merely a jurisdictional fact.109  Accordingly, 
the Court reversed the dismissal and remanded for further 
proceedings presumably including a jury trial on the issue of the 
worth of the land.110  While Barry and Smithers are not clear in their 
discussion of jurisdictional facts that might be intertwined with the 
merits of the case, they establish that, even before the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and Rule 12(b)(1), the Court was concerned 
about the possibility of infringing upon a plaintiff’s right to a trial by 
jury under the guise of deciding “jurisdictional” questions.111 
After the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,112 the 
Court decided Land113 and Bell.114  These ensuing decisions are 
important as they illustrate that the earlier cases are consistent with 
the later adopted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The petitioners 
in Land were members of the United States Maritime Commission.115  
The respondents, stockholders of Dollar Steamship Lines, Inc., Ltd., 
had entered into a contract with the petitioners whereby they 
delivered “their common stock in Dollar . . . to the Commission.”116  
In return, the petitioners released the respondents from certain 
obligations and made a loan to the respondents’ corporation.117  After 
repaying the loans, respondents asked for the return of their shares, 
claiming they had been pledged only as collateral.118  When the 
petitioners refused to return the shares, the respondents sued 
them.119  The trial court held that the suit was against the United 
States and dismissed the complaint.120  The court of appeals reversed, 
holding that “the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint on 
jurisdictional grounds because the question of whether the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity applied raised controversial questions of law 
 
 108 Id. at 645-46. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Smithers, 204 U.S. at 645-46. 
 111 See Barry, 116 U.S. 550; see also Smithers, 204 U.S. 632. 
 112 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 98. 
 113 330 U.S. 731 (1947). 
 114 327 U.S. 678 (1946). 
 115 Land, 330 U.S. at 733. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 734. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
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and fact proper for presentation to a trial court.”121  The petitioners 
sought a writ of certiorari.122  The Court granted the petition and 
affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the 
allegations of the complaint, if proven, would illustrate that the 
petitioners were unlawfully withholding the respondents’ property by 
claiming it belonged to the United States.123  Thus, the Court 
distinguished the “type of case where the question of jurisdiction is 
dependent on a decision of the merits” from a case in which the 
jurisdictional issue stands on its own.124  The Court, however, went no 
further than to state this difference between the two types of cases. 
In Bell, the Court did not directly address whether a 
jurisdictional fact could be decided by the court without regard to 
whether it was part of the merits.125 The Court, however, wrote 
broadly about the appropriate approach to jurisdiction in federal 
question cases: “where the complaint . . . is so drawn as to seek 
recovery directly under the Constitution or laws of the United States, 
the federal court, but for two possible exceptions . . . must entertain 
the suit . . . .”126  The two exceptions referred to are: 1) when a claim 
appears to be “immaterial and made solely for the purpose of 
obtaining jurisdiction,” and 2) when a claim “is wholly insubstantial 
or frivolous.”127  If either of these exceptions applies, the court may 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.128  Under Bell, if a claim does not fit 
into either of these two exceptions, then the court has jurisdiction 
over the case, and the case may not be dismissed.129  Under this 
formulation, any case involving a non-frivolous, non-pretextual claim 
in which the jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits 
 
 121 Land v. Dollar, 154 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 329 U.S. 700 (1946). 
 122 Land, 329 U.S. 700. 
 123 Land, 330 U.S. at 734-35. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Bell, 327 U.S. 678.  The petitioners in Bell sued agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations in federal district court.  Id. at 679.  The petitioners alleged that their 
rights under Amendments IV and V of the United States Constitution had been 
violated.  Id.  The district court dismissed the petitioner’s suit and the court of 
appeals affirmed the dismissal.  Id. at 680.  The Supreme Court, however, reversed 
the dismissal of the petitioner’s suit.  Id. at 684-85.  The Court noted that the 
petitioner’s complaint sought recovery directly under the United States Constitution 
and was neither frivolous nor wholly insubstantial.  Id. at 683.  Thus, the district court 
was required to entertain the suit: “Whether petitioners could recover monetary 
judgments against respondents for alleged constitutional violations was an issue of 
law that the district court had jurisdiction to consider.”  Id. at 678. 
 126 Id. at 681-82. 
 127 Id. at 682-83. 
 128 Id. at 682. 
 129 Id. at 682-83. 
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would not be subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1).  Indeed, 
following the logic of Bell, the courts should generally take a very 
narrow approach to Rule 12(b)(1) in federal question cases. 
These Supreme Court cases only hinted to what we now identify 
as the “intertwined with the merits” exception.  The courts of appeals 
were left to interpret the early decisions of the Supreme Court and 
frame their own understanding of what we now denominate this 
exception.  Two early court of appeals cases, Schramm v. Oakes130and 
Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,131 suggested 
that district courts could not always decide the jurisdictional issue 
separate from the merits.132  In Schramm, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated that “where the issue of 
jurisdiction is dependant upon a decision on the merits . . . the trial 
court should determine jurisdiction by proceeding to a decision on 
the merits.”133  This, the court stated, would “prevent a summary 
decision on the merits without the ordinary incidents of a trial, 
including the right to a jury.”134  Schramm was a diversity action arising 
out of an automobile collision, and the Tenth Circuit held that the 
district court improperly dismissed the plaintiffs’ action.135 The action 
arose under the New Mexico Nonresident Motorist Statute and 
involved a vehicle driven by an employee of nonresidents who had an 
interest in the automobile.136  The question was whether the statute 
reached the nonresidents in this situation, and the court held that 
the plaintiffs should have been given the opportunity during a trial 
on the merits to prove the jurisdiction of the nonresidents under the 
statute.137  Since jurisdiction was tied to the merits of the cause of 
action, the court found it was appropriate to postpone a 
determination of jurisdiction and allow the case to be decided on the 
 
 130 352 F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1965). 
 131 253 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1958). 
 132 Schramm, 352 F.2d 143; Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 253 F.2d 780. 
 133 Schramm, 352 F.2d at 149. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 150 (Schramm involved personal, not subject matter, jurisdiction).  The 
same rules, however, apply in both situations and they are (and should be) treated 
the same. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id.  If the appellants could establish a master-servant or agency relationship, 
liability might be established.  Id. at 150.  Additionally, the court noted that because a 
permit was required to take the car through the State of New Mexico, it was possible 
“that the owner would be liable for acts even of an independent contractor where the 
independent contractor operates a vehicle under a highway permit or franchise 
granted the owner.”  Id. 
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merits.138  The plaintiffs should not have been denied the opportunity 
to move past the preliminary hearing, the court stated, because the 
possibility existed for proving the jurisdiction of the nonresidents.139 
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co.,140 a diversity proceeding commenced by 
the plaintiff to recover money for the loss of goods in an intrastate 
shipment, was initially dismissed by the district court for not meeting 
§ 1332’s amount in controversy requirement.141  On appeal, the Sixth 
Circuit held that because it “did not appear to a legal certainty” from 
the face of the pleadings that the plaintiff could not recover the sum 
which it claimed, it was error to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim.142  The 
court declared that “where the jurisdictional issue as to amount in 
controversy can not be decided without the ruling constituting at the 
same time a ruling on the merits of the case, the case should be 
heard and determined on its merits through regular trial 
procedure.”143 
Schramm and Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. both alluded to an 
“intertwined with the merits” exception, but the exception was first 
clearly expressed in a Fifth Circuit opinion, McBeath v. Inter-American 
Citizens for Decency Committee.144  The Fifth Circuit opined that: 
Undoubtedly, under Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure a court may determine the prerequisites to jurisdiction 
in advance of a trial on the merits.  However, where the factual 
and jurisdictional issues are completely intermeshed the 
 
 138 Schramm, 352 F.2d at 149. 
 139 Id. at 150. 
 140 253 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1958). 
 141 Id. at 781. 
 142 Id. at 784. 
The “legal certainty” test referred to in Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. has long been 
recognized as the standard used in amount in controversy cases.  See, e.g., Zacharia v. 
Harbor Island Spa, Inc., 684 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. S. Pac. Transp. 
Co., 543 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1976); Fehling v. Cantonwine, 522 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 
1975); Gill v. Allstate Ins. Co., 458 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1972).  When a plaintiff brings a 
case under § 1332, his claim that the amount in controversy exceeds the requisite 
jurisdictional amount is “deemed to be made in good faith so long as it is not clear to 
a legal certainty that the claimant could not recover a judgment exceeding the 
jurisdictional amount.”  5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1350, at 231.  
Essentially, this seems to be a version or application of the “intertwined with the 
merits” exception.  Since the amount in controversy is rather clearly intertwined with 
the merits, courts should not dismiss a case for an insufficient amount in controversy 
unless they can say, to a legal certainty, that the requisite amount could not be 
recovered.  Absent that legal certainty, for a court to dismiss a case as having an 
insufficient amount in controversy would be to decide a crucial part of the merits in 
the guise of deciding a jurisdictional fact. 
 143 Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 253 F.2d at 784. 
 144 374 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1967). 
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jurisdictional issues should be referred to the merits, for it is 
impossible to decide the one without the other.145 
In McBeath, the plaintiff, a newspaper publisher, sued the defendants 
for injuring him in violation of the Sherman Act by conspiring to 
restrain interstate and foreign trade.146  The defendants moved to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but the court held that 
“the question of jurisdiction here, including the existence of a 
conspiracy and a boycott or secondary boycott and their significant 
effect on interstate commerce, is . . . inextricably connected with the 
merits of the case . . . .”147  Therefore, these issues should be resolved 
at trial together with the merits of the case.148 
The earlier Supreme Court cases, especially Land and Bell, had 
an instrumental role in McBeath’s clear articulation of the 
“intertwined with the merits” exception to Rule 12(b)(1).149  In 
McBeath, the court stated that “where the factual and jurisdictional 
issues are completely intermeshed the jurisdictional issues should be 
referred to the merits . . . .”150  This is consistent with the Supreme 
Court cases, which make clear that a court’s power to dismiss a case 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is limited when a jurisdictional 
issue cannot be decided without also ruling on the merits of the 
plaintiff’s claim.151  McBeath is also consistent with Bell because, when 
jurisdictional facts are “intermeshed” with the merits of the cause of 
action, the federal court must exercise jurisdiction over the case and 
rule on the merits.152  In so doing, McBeath does not narrow or 
broaden the scope of subject matter jurisdiction as set forth in Bell.  
Further, McBeath is generally representative of the courts of appeals’ 
decisions on the general question of the exercise of Rule 12(b)(1) 
power.153 
 
 145 Id. at 362-63. 
 146 Id. at 360.  Plaintiff here invoked jurisdiction “under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 which 
confers jurisdiction on district courts of any civil action arising under any Act of 
Congress protecting trade and commerce against restraints, and under the Clayton 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, which also authorizes such a suit and provides for treble damages 
sustained by reason of injury resulting from violations of antitrust laws.”  Id.  In 
situations such as this, where jurisdiction is based on a specialized jurisdictional grant 
instead of on § 1331, the analysis in terms of jurisdictional facts and the “intertwined 
with the merits” exception is the same.  Id. 
 147 Id. at 363. 
 148 Id. 
 149 See McBeath, 374 F.2d 359. 
 150 Id. at 363. 
 151 See supra notes 91-129 and accompanying text. 
 152 McBeath, 374 F.2d at 362-63. 
 153 See, e.g., Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that 
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The question remains, however, whether McBeath and related 
cases are required by either Supreme Court authority.  Entangled 
with this question, not surprisingly, is the extent to which the 
Supreme Court’s precedents are rooted in the constitutional right to 
a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.  The Supreme Court 
authority makes it clear that the jury plays an important role in 
determining issues of fact.154  The function of the “intertwined with 
the merits” exception, to the extent that it departs from the plain 
language of Rule 12(b)(1), is to ensure that issues of fact normally 
decided by the jury are not decided by the court under the rubric of 
“jurisdictional facts.”  In short, the exception polices the application 
of Rule 12(b)(1) to ensure that the right to a jury trial is preserved.  
To the extent that the exception to Rule 12(b)(1) must be applied 
consistently and uniformly in order to preserve the essential role 
played by the jury, a clear articulation of the “intertwined with the 
merits” exception is necessary. 
C.  The Application of the “Intertwined With the Merits” Exception to 
Rule 12(b)(1) 
While the courts of appeals generally agree on how Rule 
12(b)(1) and the “intertwined with the merits” exception are supposed 
to be applied, it is evident that the actual application of Rule 
12(b)(1) and the exception has not been consistent.155  Not only are 
the courts of appeals inconsistent with each other,156 but, what is most 
 
when jurisdictional facts are intertwined with the merits of the case, the court can 
assume jurisdiction and defer deciding on such issue until trial); United States v. 
North Carolina, 180 F.3d 574 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that, because the jurisdictional 
issue requires proof of what is also needed to win on the merits, the jurisdictional 
issues in the Title VII suit are not suited for resolution by a Rule 12(b)(1) motion); 
Bell v. United States, 127 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that whether the 
government’s actions are within the limited waiver provided by the FTCA is an 
example of a jurisdictional fact intertwined with the merits of the case); Lawrence v. 
Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that when jurisdictional facts 
are intertwined with the merits of the claim, any jurisdictional issues should not be 
decided on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion but should rather be held for a determination 
on the merits); Barrett v. United States, 853 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 154 See Barry, 116 U.S. at 565 (stating that “[i]n no case is it permissible for the 
court to substitute itself for the jury”); Smithers, 204 U.S. at 645 (stating that the 
court’s “limits ought to be ascertained” in order to prevent the court from usurping 
the role of the jury and denying the plaintiff his right to a jury trial). 
 155 See infra Part II.C.  Note that although it is unclear in many of these cases 
whether the jurisdictional grant relied upon is § 1331 or another specialized grant of 
jurisdiction, the analysis of jurisdictional facts and the “intertwined with merits” 
exception does not change.  See supra notes 7, 144-48 and accompanying text; see also 
infra Part IV. 
 156 While the Second, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits have held that 
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alarming are the inconsistencies within each circuit.157 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
provides a good example of the inconsistent application of Rule 
12(b)(1) and the “intertwined with the merits” exception.  Hukill v. 
Auto Care, Inc.,158 and United States v. North Carolina,159 both decided in 
1999, differ in their approach to jurisdictional facts.  In Hukill, the 
court, in analyzing a claim under the FMLA, held that, if the 
defendant is not an “employer” as defined by the statute, the district 
court has no subject matter jurisdiction.160  In contrast, in North 
Carolina, the court decided that the language of Title VII requiring a 
pattern or practice of discrimination is not jurisdictional but is merits-
related because, in order to prevail on the merits, the United States 
must prove a pattern or practice of discrimination.161  While the two 
 
the fifteen-employee requirements of Title VII and the ADA, are not jurisdictional, 
many of the other circuits, as will be further examined, have inconsistent rulings on 
this or similar issues.  See Da Silva v. Kinsho Int’l Corp., 229 F.3d 358 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(stating that the threshold number of employees in a Title VII case is not purely 
jurisdictional where the claim is non-frivolous); Sharpe v. Jefferson Distrib. Co., 148 
F.3d 676, 677 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the “plaintiff’s inability to demonstrate 
that the defendant has 15 employees is just like any other failure to meet a statutory 
requirement,” thus the issue is not purely jurisdictional); EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier 
Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that the employee 
requirement under the ADA is not purely jurisdictional but implicates the merits of 
the case so Rule 12(b)(1) should not be applied). 
The Second, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits, unlike many of the 
other circuits, all reached the conclusion that the threshold number of employees is 
not purely jurisdictional by reasoning that, if the basis for subject matter jurisdiction 
is also an element of the plaintiff’s federal cause of action, then the court must 
assume jurisdiction over the case and reserve further inquiry for the trial on the 
merits unless the claim is frivolous or pre-textual.  Da Silva, 229 F.3d at 364 (quoting 
Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1190 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(noting that “in federal question cases, the very statute that creates the cause of 
action often confers jurisdiction as well . . . [and that since] jurisdiction is authority 
to decide the case either way . . . unsuccessful as well as successful suits may be 
brought upon the act”)); Sharpe, 148 F.3d at 677; St. Francis, 117 F.3d at 624 (citing 
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946)); see also Bleiler v. Cristwood Constr. Inc., 72 F.3d 
13 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that “the conclusion that . . . Cristwood . . . [is not] a 
statutory [employer] merely reflects the lack of a remedy against them under federal 
law, not the lack of a federal question”). 
This is consistent with Bell because under Bell, once the claim is based on a 
federal statute, the only way the court can dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction is if the claim is so insubstantial that it lacks any merit. 
 157 See infra Part II.C. 
 158 192 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 159 180 F.3d 574 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 160 Hukill, 192 F.3d at 441. 
 161 North Carolina, 180 F.3d at 580.  Arguably, the question of whether there is a 
“pattern or practice of discrimination” applies only to the proper plaintiff in the suit.  
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2002).  Just as this is a merits-related issue, however, so 
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cases involve different federal statutes, the FMLA and Title VII, the 
two results are irreconcilable because both cases take an element of 
the cause of action,162 which also happens to be the basis for subject 
matter jurisdiction, and reach different results.163 
Similar inconsistencies can be found in the Fifth Circuit.  In 
Greenless v. Eidenmuller Enterprises, Inc.,164 the court of appeals held that 
the defendant’s failure to meet the threshold number of employees 
necessary for Title VII’s definition of an employer warrants dismissal 
of the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.165  In two earlier 
cases, however, Clark v. Tarrant County166 and Williamson v. Tucker,167 
the court held that, when an element of the plaintiff’s federal cause 
of action is also a basis for subject matter jurisdiction, the court 
should assume jurisdiction and decide the case on the merits.168  In 
Clark, the federal cause of action was Title VII and the dispute once 
again focused on the requisite number of employees for a Title VII 
“employer.”169 
Inconsistencies have plagued the Ninth Circuit as well.  Courts 
 
to is whether or not the defendant meets the requisite number of employees.  Id. 
 162 In Hukill, the element referred to is the threshold number of employees 
necessary to satisfy the definition of an employer under the FMLA. 192 F.3d at 441-
42.  In North Carolina, the court determined that the element of the cause of action is 
the threshold requirement that there be a pattern or practice of discrimination 
present.  180 F.3d at 580-81. 
 163 Note the results are not only inconsistent within the circuit, but are also 
inconsistent as applied to Bell.  Neither case should have been dismissed for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction because there was a federal question involved and the 
claims did not fit into either of the two allowed exceptions noted in Bell: the claims 
were neither frivolous nor pre-textual.  See, e.g., Bell, 327 U.S. 678. 
 164 32 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 165 Id. at 200. 
 166 798 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 167 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 168 Clark, 798 F.2d at 742; Williamson, 645 F.2d at 415 (noting that “where the 
defendant’s challenge to the court’s jurisdiction is also a challenge to the existence 
of a federal cause of action, the proper course of action for the district court . . . is to 
find that jurisdiction exists and deal with the objection as a direct attack on the 
merits of the plaintiff’s case . . . [because] in that situation no purpose is served by 
indirectly arguing the merits in the context of federal jurisdiction”). 
Once the merits are reached, if the federal claim fails, the court should dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6), not Rule 12(b)(1): 
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, 
whether a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, shall be 
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made 
by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 169 Clark, 798 F.2d at 742. 
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have taken two different approaches to the question of when a 
jurisdictional fact is intertwined with the merits of the case.  
According to Brown v. Atkinson,170 Careau Group v. United Farm Workers 
of America,171 and Sun Valley Gasoline, Inc. v. Ernst Enterprises, Inc.,172 a 
jurisdictional fact is intertwined with the merits when the same 
provision is the basis for both jurisdiction and the plaintiff’s 
substantive federal claims.173  A case that preceded these three 
opinions, however, Childs v. Local 18,174 decided that, even though 
Title VII was both the basis for jurisdiction and the basis for the 
plaintiff’s claims, the case should be dismissed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction where the threshold number of employees was not 
met.175 
Finally, the Tenth Circuit has also been inconsistent.  In 2002, it 
decided Calvert v. Midwest Restoration Services, Inc.,176 holding that the 
number of employees required to make Title VII applicable was a 
jurisdictional issue that could be decided by the court.177  This was 
consistent with a 1980 case, Owens v. Rush,178 in which it also held that 
 
 170 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 24098 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1998) (holding that the 
number of employees required for Title VII to apply is not purely jurisdictional since 
the same statute that makes up the federal cause of action is also the basis for 
jurisdiction). 
 171 940 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the jurisdictional issue was also a 
merits issue because the proof needed to prevail on the merits was the same proof 
required to show jurisdiction). 
 172 711 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that where the statute provides the basis 
for both the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court and the plaintiff’s 
substantive claims, the jurisdictional issue and the merits will be considered 
intertwined) (quoting Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 602 
(9th Cir. 1976)). 
 173 Brown, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 24098, at *2; Careau, 940 F.2d at 1293; Sun Valley 
Gasoline, 711 F.2d at 139-40. 
 174 719 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 175 Id. 
 176 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9747 (10th Cir. May 22, 2002). 
 177 Id. at *8. 
 178 636 F.2d 283 (10th Cir. 1980).  Why, in 1980, the court was deciding whether 
the fifteen-employee requirement was jurisdictional is perplexing since prior to 1991, 
there was no right to a jury trial under Title VII.  See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196 (stating 
that “jury trial is not required in an action for reinstatement and backpay”); Robinson, 
444 F.2d at 802 (stating that the demand for backpay under Title VII is to be 
determined through the exercise of the court’s discretion).  Perhaps it was an easy 
way for the court to dismiss the case because Rule 12(b)(1) existed and not much 
analysis was needed to support the court’s ruling.  Arguably, at the time Owens was 
decided, the court enjoyed a broad power to decide such facts in Title VII cases as 
jurisdictional issues because there was no possibility of infringing upon the plaintiff’s 
right to a jury trial. 
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the fifteen-employee requirement was jurisdictional.179  Calvert, 
however, did not mention cases decided after Owens, which stated 
that where subject matter jurisdiction is based upon the same 
provision that creates the plaintiff’s federal cause of action, the court 
must assume jurisdiction and then decide the case on the merits.180  
The first of these cases to articulate the proposition was Wheeler v. 
Hurdman,181  which declared that, when jurisdiction and the 
substantive claim are based upon the same federal statute, the court 
should assume jurisdiction; this is consistent with Bell.182  The result of 
Calvert and Owens, however, is not.183 
 
 179 Calvert, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9747, at *8. 
 180 See Sizova v. Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., 282 F.3d 1320 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(noting that if the resolution of the jurisdictional issue requires a resolution of an 
aspect of the plaintiff’s substantive claim, then the jurisdictional issue is intertwined 
with the merits and Rule 12 (b)(1) cannot apply); Bloomer v. Norman Reg’l Hosp., 
No. 99-6074, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 16099 (10th Cir. July 12, 2000) (noting that, 
because the basis for jurisdiction and the plaintiff’s substantive claim is the 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Women in Active Labor Act (EMTALA), the 
court has to assume jurisdiction unless the claim is frivolous or immaterial); Pringle 
v. United States, 208 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that the determination of 
whether the Feres doctrine is applicable to the case calls into question the merits of 
the plaintiff’s Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim so any dismissal should be for 
failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted, not for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction); Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting 
that the determination of whether one is an “employer” under Title VII is not a 
purely jurisdictional issue but also implicates the merits because the jurisdictional 
issue is dependant on the same statute which forms the basis of the plaintiff’s federal 
cause of action) (citing Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 1986)); 
Sun Valley Gasoline, 711 F.2d at 139; Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 
597, 602 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 181 825 F.2d 257. 
 182 Id. at 259.  Compare Wheeler, 825 F.2d 257 (stating that where subject matter 
jurisdiction is based upon the same provision which creates the plaintiff’s federal 
cause of action, the court must assume jurisdiction and then decide the case on the 
merits), with Bell, 327 U.S. 678 (noting that when a federal statute is the basis for the 
plaintiff’s claim, the court should assume jurisdiction unless the claim is frivolous or 
wholly insubstantial). 
Note that two of the cases decided after Wheeler, Pringle and Sizova, tried to 
narrow Wheeler by stating that it was not enough that the jurisdictional statute and the 
plaintiff’s substantive claim were based upon the same federal statute, but that 
resolution of the jurisdictional issue had to depend upon resolution of an aspect of 
the substantive claim.  See Pringle, 208 F.3d at 1222-23; Sizova, 282 F.3d at 1324-25.  
This is a circular argument, however, because if the jurisdictional statute and the 
statute providing the basis for the substantive claim are one and the same, then 
naturally resolution of a jurisdictional element will require resolution of an element 
of the plaintiff’s claim.  Therefore, as articulated in Bell, it should be enough for 
subject matter jurisdiction that the plaintiff’s cause of action is based upon a federal 
statute.  See Bell, 327 U.S. 678. 
 183 Compare Wheeler, 825 F.2d 257, 259 (stating that where subject matter 
jurisdiction is based upon the same provision which creates the plaintiff’s federal 
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This analysis of circuit court authority illustrates the extent to 
which courts have inconsistently applied the “intertwined with the 
merits” exception.  Not only are the circuits themselves inconsistent 
in their application of the exception, but more importantly, there are 
inconsistencies within the individual circuits.  The scope of this 
inconsistency exemplifies the confusion surrounding Rule 12(b)(1) 
and the “intertwined with merits” exception, and also makes clear 
that, in order to ensure plaintiffs are treated fairly and uniformly 
throughout the circuits, the law must be clarified. 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY 
The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a trial by jury in 
some civil cases.184  The language of the amendment preserves the 
right to a jury trial only for “[s]uits at common law.”185  To determine 
whether a suit is one which existed at common law, it has generally 
been accepted that the courts must employ the “so-called historical 
test” of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial; in other words, 
the court must be “guided by the practice of English courts in 
1791.”186  If, in 1791 English practice, the jury would have been 
 
cause of action, the court must assume jurisdiction and then decide the case on the 
merits), and Bell, 327 U.S. 678, 681-82 (noting that when a federal statute is the basis 
for the plaintiff’s claim, the court should assume jurisdiction unless the claim is 
frivolous or wholly insubstantial), with Calvert, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9747, *8 
(holding that the number of employees required to make Title VII applicable is 
jurisdictional; having a federal statute as the basis for your claim is not enough for 
subject matter jurisdiction), and Owens, 636 F.2d 283, 287 (stating that the fifteen-
employee requirement is jurisdictional; Title VII claim is not enough to establish 
subject matter jurisdiction). 
Both Calvert and Owens, if following Bell, would have assumed jurisdiction over 
the case and then would have decided the case on the merits.  See Bell, 327 U.S. 678.  
Then, if the federal claim failed, the case would have been properly dismissed under 
Rule 12 (b)(6), not Rule 12 (b)(1).  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 184 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact 
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the common law. 
Id. 
 185 Id. 
 186 See, e.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998); 
Wooddell v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93 (1991); Chauffeurs, 
Teamsters, & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990); Tull v. United 
States, 481 U.S. 412 (1986); Baltimore & Carolina Line Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 
(1935); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935); see also Margaret L. Moses, What the 
Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court’s Evolving Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 183, 187-92 (2000); Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the 
Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1021-24 (1992); 
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“impaneled” in the particular type of case, then “generally a jury is 
required by the [S]eventh [A]mendment.”187 
Once the right to a jury trial has been established, the question 
remains as to the scope of that right.188  The Supreme Court has 
noted that “[t]he [Seventh] Amendment [does] not bind the federal 
courts to the exact procedural incidents or details of jury trials 
according to the common law in 1791 any more than it tie[s] them to 
the common law system of pleading or the specific rules of evidence 
then prevailing.”189  An important question, therefore, is whether 
such changes in practice or procedure infringe upon the very 
substance of the Seventh Amendment—the “jury’s role as finder of 
fact?”190  The substance of the guarantee preserved by the Seventh 
Amendment is the jury’s role as the ultimate trier of fact.  In order to 
preserve the essence of the Seventh Amendment, a court must be 
careful not to abuse its power under Rule 12(b)(1). 
Rule 12(b)(1) allows a judge to decide jurisdictional facts 
without a jury trial; the Seventh Amendment preserves the role of the 
jury as fact-finder.191  Although seemingly irreconcilable, these two 
concepts are not necessarily incompatible with each other.  In cases 
decided only by a bench trial—as was true for Title VII before the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991192—there is no constitutional barrier to the 
application of Rule 12(b)(1) as it is written, and there may be no 
need for an “intertwined with the merits” exception.  In such cases, 
whether the court decides a question early, by resolving a Rule 
12(b)(1) motion,193 or later, after a full trial, implicates only questions 
of judicial efficiency.  Where, however, the constitutional right to a 
 
Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of 
Rational Decision Making, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 486, 486-87 (1975); Charles W. Wolfram, 
The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 640 (1973); 
Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 
289, 319 (1966). 
 187 Wolfram, supra note 186, at 640. 
 188 Moses, supra note 186, at 199. 
 189 Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390 (1943); see also Colgrove v. Battin, 
413 U.S. 149, 156 (1973) (citing the decision in Galloway with approval). 
 190 Moses, supra note 186, at 199-200; see also Walker v. New Mexico & Southern 
Pacific R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897) (noting that the substance of the  Seventh 
Amendment is the right to a jury trial; it is the function of the jury and not the court 
to decide questions of fact). 
 191 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, at 12-36; Moses, supra note 186, at 199-200. 
 192 See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196-97 (stating that “jury trial is not required in an action 
for reinstatement and backpay”); Robinson, 444 F.2d at 802 (stating that the demand 
for backpay under Title VII is to be determined through the exercise of the court’s 
discretion). 
 193 See FED. R. CIV. P. 38-39 (authorizing the use of partial trials). 
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trial by jury attaches to a plaintiff’s claim, the only way that Rule 
12(b)(1) does not limit the right to a trial by jury is if it is interpreted 
to apply only to purely jurisdictional facts—that is, those facts that are 
not intertwined with the merits of the claim.194  Thus, the “intertwined 
with the merits” exception to Rule 12(b)(1) is necessary to preserve 
the plaintiff’s right to a jury trial on any issue involving the merits of 
the case.  Allowing a judge to decide issues that are intertwined with 
the merits of a plaintiff’s case infringes upon the plaintiff’s right to a 
trial by jury.195 
A.  Significance of the Right to a Trial By Jury 
The significance of a plaintiff’s right to a jury trial is evidenced 
by Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover.196  Beacon Theaters, Inc., sought 
 
 194 Although Title VII now clearly provides a statutory right to a jury trial, whether 
there is also a constitutional right to a jury trial under Title VII is still unresolved.  If 
there is no constitutional right to a jury trial, then Congress can restrict it; 
consequently, there would  no longer be any question regarding whether Rule 
12(b)(1) and the inconsistent application of the “intertwined with the merits” 
exception infringes upon the constitutional right to a jury trial.  The problem with 
this argument, however, is that Title VII now provides both compensatory and 
punitive damages.  Thus, it is difficult to imagine how the constitutional right to a 
jury trial is not implicated. 
 195 See Barry, 116 U.S. at 565; see also Smithers, 204 U.S. at 645. 
A response to the argument that allowing a judge to decide issues that are 
intertwined with merits of the plaintiff’s case infringes upon the plaintiff’s right to a 
jury trial is that the jury trial problem can be avoided by denying any preclusive effect 
to the federal court’s factfinding if the case is refiled in state court.  If this seems 
inconsistent with the premises of the federal court’s dismissal, however, perhaps it 
illustrates that the federal court’s dismissal was actually a decision on the merits, and 
not simply a jurisdictional determination. 
 196 359 U.S. 500 (1959).  In Beacon, Fox West Coast Theaters asked for declaratory 
relief against Beacon Theaters.  Id. at 502.  Fox alleged that there was a controversy 
under both the Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2, 
and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, 38 Stat. 731.  Id.  In its complaint entitled 
“Complaint for Declaratory Relief,” Fox asserted that it operated a movie theater in 
San Bernardino, California, and that it had exclusive rights from movie distributors 
to show “first run” pictures in the “San Bernardino competitive area.”  Id. at 502-03.  
Fox also asserted that the contracts with the movie distributors provided it with 
“clearance”—a period in which no other theater could exhibit the same picture.  Id. 
at 502. 
Beacon Theaters had built a drive-in theater about eleven miles out of San 
Bernardino; it notified Fox that it considered Fox’s contracts with the movie 
distributors to be a violation of anti-trust laws.  Id.  Fox alleged in its complaint that 
Beacon threatened a treble damage suit against Fox and its distributors and that this 
deprived Fox of a “valuable property right—the right to negotiate for exclusive first-
run contracts.”  Id.  Fox then asked for both an injunction to prevent Beacon from 
commencing any action against it under the antitrust laws, and a declaration that a 
grant of “clearance” between Fox and Beacon was reasonable and not in violation of 
antitrust laws.  Id. at 502-03.  Beacon’s answer and counterclaim against Fox “asserted 
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mandamus to require a district court judge to vacate orders that 
allegedly deprived it of a jury trial.197  The district judge had 
compelled Beacon Theaters to split up its claims, trying some to the 
judge and others to the jury.198  The Supreme Court found this to be 
impermissible: where the petitioner is seeking legal relief, the 
constitutional right to a jury trial cannot be defeated simply by 
joining a demand for equitable relief.199  The Court stated, 
“[m]aintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such 
importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and 
jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial 
should be scrutinized with the utmost care.”200  More important than 
this general principle was the Court’s finding that the trial court’s 
exercise of discretion to deprive Beacon Theaters of a full jury trial 
was not justifiable.201 
A similar result was reached more recently in Lytle v. Household 
Manufacturing, Inc.,202  where the lower court had dismissed the 
petitioner’s § 1981 legal claims and held a bench trial on the 
remaining Title VII equitable claims.203  After reversing the dismissal 
of the § 1981 claims, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of 
 
that there was no substantial competition between the two theaters, that the 
clearances granted were therefore unreasonable, and that a conspiracy existed 
between Fox and its distributors to manipulate contracts . . . so as to restrain trade 
and monopolize first-run pictures . . . in violation of the anti-trust laws.”  Id. at 503. 
Beacon asked for a jury trial of all the factual issues in the case.  Id.  The district 
court, however, viewed the issues raised by Fox’s “Complaint for Declaratory Relief” 
as essentially equitable.  Id.  It, therefore, found that the issues raised by Fox should 
be tried by the court alone before the jury determined the validity of the anti-trust 
violations that Beacon alleged in its counterclaim.  Id. 
 197 Beacon, 359 U.S. at 501. 
 198 Id. at 503-05. 
 199 Id. at 510. 
 200 Id. at 501 (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935)). 
 201 Id. at 508. 
 202 494 U.S. 545 (1990).  Petitioner Lytle, an African-American, filed a cause of 
action under both Title VII and § 1981, alleging that respondent Schwitzer had 
terminated his employment because of race and had later retaliated against him for 
filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission by not 
providing adequate references to prospective employers.  Id. at 547-48.  He requested 
a jury trial for all applicable issues.  Id. at 548.  The district court, however, dismissed 
the petitioner’s § 1981 claims and decided that Title VII provided an exclusive 
remedy.  Id.  It then held a bench trial on the petitioner’s Title VII claims.  Id. at 549.  
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, although finding that the lower court’s decision 
as to the § 1981 claims was erroneous, nevertheless held that the District Court’s 
findings regarding the Title VII claims collaterally estopped the petitioner from 
litigating his § 1981 claims “because the elements of a cause of action under § 1981 
are identical to those under Title VII.”  Id. at 549. 
 203 Id. at 548-49. 
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collateral estoppel did not bar relitigation of the issues decided by 
the judge because it would not “constitute a second, separate 
action.”204  It was the lower court’s erroneous dismissal of the 
petitioner’s § 1981 claims that allowed it to resolve the equitable 
claims through a bench trial in the first instance.205  If the § 1981 
claims had not been wrongfully dismissed, Lytle would have been 
entitled to a full jury trial on any issues common to both the § 1981 
legal claims and the Title VII equitable claims.206  Consequently, the 
jury’s determinations of both legal and factual issues could not then 
have been disregarded by the district court upon consideration of the 
petitioner’s equitable claims.207 
Both Beacon and Lytle illustrate the significance of the right to a 
jury trial.208  Courts, while having broad discretion to decide 
jurisdictional facts, may not exercise that discretion where it would 
infringe upon the plaintiff’s right to a jury trial.209  By deciding issues 
that are intertwined with the merits of the case under the guise of 
determining a purely jurisdictional issue, courts are limiting a 
plaintiff’s right to a trial by jury. 
The “intertwined with the merits” exception is, thus, not merely 
a judge-made rule interpreting Rule 12(b)(1), but rather a 
constitutionally-mandated application of that Rule.210  Without it, 
plaintiffs would be denied their right to have a trial by jury.  It is not 
enough, however, to recognize that such an exception exists.  As 
discussed earlier, the courts of appeals are extremely inconsistent in 
their application of the “intertwined with the merits” exception.211  If 
 
 204 Id. The Court distinguished Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), 
by noting that the holding in Parklane, “that a court’s determinations of issues in an 
equitable action could collaterally estop relitigation of the same issues in a 
subsequent legal action without violating a litigant’s right to a jury trial,” did not 
apply because Lytle’s § 1981 claim was not a subsequent legal action.  Lytle, 494 U.S. 
at 547.  Where the court wrongfully dismisses a plaintiff’s legal claims, relitigation of 
the equitable issues decided by the court in a bench trial is permissible.  Id. 
 205 Lytle, 494 U.S. at 548-49. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. at 556. 
 208 See Beacon, 359 U.S. 500; see also Lytle, 494 U.S. 545. 
 209 See generally Beacon, 359 U.S. 500; Lytle, 494 U.S. 545. 
 210 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VII.  Arguably, it is an interpretation of the 
rules inspired by such constitutional concerns as avoiding unnecessary constitutional 
decisions. 
 211 Compare Da Silva v. Kinsho Int’l Corp., 229 F.3d 358 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that 
the threshold number of employees in a Title VII case is not purely jurisdictional 
where the claim is non-frivolous); Sharpe v. Jefferson Distrib. Co., 148 F.3d 676 (7th 
Cir. 1998) (holding that the “plaintiff’s inability to demonstrate that the defendant 
has 15 employees is just like any other failure to meet a statutory requirement,” thus 
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the exception is not applied both correctly and consistently plaintiffs 
will continue to lose their right to a jury trial.212 
B.  Title VII & The Right to a Jury Trial 
While the “intertwined with the merits” exception has been 
applied in cases dealing with a variety of federal statutes, one area in 
which the application of the exception is notably inconsistent is in 
Title VII cases.213  Before 1991, in Title VII cases, judges could decide 
purely jurisdictional facts, jurisdictional facts that were intertwined 
with the merits, and purely merits-related facts because there was no 
right to a jury trial under Title VII.214  At the time, Rule 12(b)(1) was 
an efficient method of filtering out the frivolous and insubstantial 
cases; as importantly, it did so without infringing upon the rights of 
any parties to the suit.215  The Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, 
 
the issue is not purely jurisdictional); EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 
F.3d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that the employee requirement under the ADA is 
not a purely jurisdictional but implicates the merits of the case so Rule 12(b)(1) 
should not be applied), and United States v. North Carolina, 180 F.3d 574 (4th Cir. 
1999) (noting that the language of Title VII requiring a “pattern or practice of 
discrimination” is not jurisdictional but merits-related), with Hukill v. Auto Care, 
Inc., 192 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that the employee requirement under the 
FMLA is purely jurisdictional), and Greenless v. Eidenmuller Enters., Inc., 32 F.3d 
197 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is 
warranted where the defendant did not meet the threshold number of employees 
necessary under Title VII). 
 212 As discussed earlier, the function of the “intertwined with the merits” 
exception is to ensure that issues of fact normally decided by the jury are not 
summarily decided by the court.  See supra Part II.B.  Thus, the purpose of the 
exception is to make certain that the plaintiff’s right to a jury trial is not infringed 
upon.  Id.  In order for the exception to serve its purpose, it must be applied both 
consistently and correctly.  Note that whether the right to a jury trial stems from the 
Constitution or a statute, the analysis of such a right in light of the “intertwined with 
the merits” exception to Rule 12(b)(1) remains the same.  See infra notes 213-16. 
 213 Compare Da Silva v. Kinsho Int’l Corp., 229 F.3d 358 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that 
the threshold number of employees in a Title VII case is not purely jurisdictional 
where the claim is non-frivolous), and Sharpe v. Jefferson Distrib. Co., 148 F.3d 676 
(7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the “plaintiff’s inability to demonstrate that the 
defendant has 15 employees is just like any other failure to meet a statutory 
requirement,” thus the issue is not purely jurisdictional), with Calvert v. Midwest 
Restoration Services, Inc., No. 01-5201, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9747 (10th Cir. May 
22, 2002) (holding that the number of employees required to make Title VII 
applicable was a jurisdictional issue that could be decided by the court), and 
Greenless v. Eidenmuller Enterprises, Inc., 32 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is warranted where the defendant did 
not meet the threshold number of employees necessary under Title VII). 
 214 Since there was no right to a jury trial, by default all issues of fact had to be 
decided by the court regardless of whether they were intertwined with the merits.  See 
Curtis, 415 U.S. 189; Robinson, 444 F.2d 791. 
 215 Because the constitutional right to a jury trial exists only for “suits at common 
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amended Title VII to include a statutory right to a trial by jury.216  
Thus, judges can no longer decide jurisdictional facts that are 
intertwined with the merits of a Title VII case without infringing 
upon the plaintiff’s right to a trial by jury.  The problem, however, is 
that because of the confusion surrounding the application of the 
“intertwined with the merits” exception, many courts are in fact 
restricting plaintiffs’ right to a trial by jury. 
In Scarfo, plaintiff’s Title VII claim was dismissed by the Eleventh 
Circuit because the court found that whether a defendant constituted 
an “employer” was a jurisdictional fact not intertwined with the merits 
of the case.217  This holding, and others like it, raises the question of 
how courts can conclude that an element of a plaintiff’s Title VII 
claim is not intertwined with the merits of the case, but is purely 
jurisdictional.  Requirements making up a federal cause of action, 
such as whether an entity meets the requisite definition of “employer” 
set forth in Title VII, are not and cannot be purely jurisdictional.  It 
would eviscerate the right to a jury trial in such cases if a judge, by 
stating that he or she is deciding a jurisdictional fact issue, decides 
elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action and then dismisses the case 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Accordingly, requirements 
making up a federal cause of action go directly to the merits of the 
plaintiff’s case; at the very least, they are intertwined with the merits 
of the case. 
The basis on which courts hold that such issues are purely 
jurisdictional is unclear.  Courts holding that such requirements are 
purely jurisdictional issues for the court to decide cannot be relying 
on § 1331218 and the propositions set forth in Bell.219  If Scarfo220 had 
 
law,” before Title VII was amended to include a statutory right to a trial by jury, the 
constitutional right to a jury trial did not apply to Title VII plaintiffs.  See Curtis, 415 
U.S. 189; Robinson, 444 F.2d 791; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VII.  Thus, courts were 
not infringing upon a plaintiff’s right to a jury trial by deciding jurisdictional fact 
issues. 
 216 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. 102-166, Title I, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) 
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2002)); see also supra note 194 and 
accompanying text regarding the implication of a constitutional right to a jury trial 
under Title VII. 
 217 See Scarfo, 175 F.3d 957. 
 218 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2001) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States.”). 
 219 See Bell, 327 U.S. 678.  Under Bell, as long as the complaint seeks recovery 
under a law of the United States or the Constitution, the federal court is obliged to 
entertain the suit unless the claim is “immaterial and made solely for the purpose of 
obtaining jurisdiction or . . . wholly insubstantial or frivolous.” Id. at 682-83.  This 
strict standard calls for a narrow approach to Rule 12(b)(1). 
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been decided according to § 1331 and the logic of Bell, the federal 
court would have first taken jurisdiction over the cause of action and 
then looked at the merits to decide whether the defendant was an 
“employer” under the statute.221  It would not have dismissed the 
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). 
If the court is not relying on § 1331 as the basis for subject 
matter jurisdiction, the only other explanation is that it is relying 
exclusively on a specialized grant of jurisdiction within Title VII.222  
This justification, however, is not convincing.  The provision granting 
jurisdiction to the federal district courts in Title VII is separate and 
distinct from the provision setting forth the statutory requirements 
relating to the number of employees required for an employer to be 
subject to the statute.223  In fact, the provision granting jurisdiction 
does not even hint that the requirements set forth in earlier 
provisions must be met before the federal district courts can claim 
subject matter jurisdiction: “[e]ach United States district court and 
each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this 
[title].”224  The provision simply grants jurisdiction to the federal 
district courts for any claim brought under Title VII.225  Therefore, 
even if the courts claimed they were relying on the specialized grant 
of jurisdiction provided in Title VII to rationalize their finding that 
whether a defendant is an “employer” is a jurisdictional fact, there is 
nothing in the grant of jurisdiction to support such a holding.226  
Indeed, the Supreme Court has rejected lower courts’ attempts to 
read other procedural requirements of Title VII as jurisdictional, 
requirements that arguably have a more plausible claim to be 
jurisdictional than the definition of “employer.”227 
 
 220 175 F.3d 957. 
 221 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also Bell, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (noting that as long as 
the plaintiff’s claim is based upon a federal cause of action, the federal court must 
assume jurisdiction and decide the case on the merits unless the claim is “immaterial 
. . . or . . . wholly insubstantial or frivolous”). 
 222 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (2001). 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. 
 227 See, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982).  In Zipes, the 
Supreme Court held that “filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is 
not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a 
statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.”  Id. at 393.  
As noted by the Court, the provision granting the district courts jurisdiction under 
Title VII “contains no reference to the timely-filing requirement.”  Id. at 393-94.  
“The provision specifying the time for filing charges with the EEOC appears as an 
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Even though Scarfo focused only on Title VII, the problems 
associated with the application of the “intertwined with the merits” 
exception are much broader.228  By applying the logic of Scarfo, 
federal courts have also wrongfully dismissed cases brought under the 
FMLA and ADEA for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.229  As in the 
cases involving Title VII, where the court decides elements of the 
cause of action by calling the issues purely jurisdictional, the dismissal 
of the plaintiff’s claim under Rule 12(b)(1) takes away the plaintiff’s 
right to a trial by jury.230 
IV.  PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The real question is what makes a jurisdictional fact “intertwined 
with the merits.”  Perhaps the logical conclusion is to hold that for 
any claim brought under § 1331,231 the jurisdictional issues are 
necessarily intertwined with the merits of the case and so the court 
must assume subject matter jurisdiction and then decide the case on 
the merits.  The only exceptions to this would be the two recognized 
 
entirely separate provision, and it does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in 
any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts.”  Id. at 394. 
Similarly, Title VII’s jurisdictional grant is separate and distinct from the 
definition section of Title VII.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5[§ 706](f)(3) (2002).  The 
jurisdictional grant contains no reference to the definition of an “employer” under 
the statute, nor does it contain a reference to any other term defined by Title VII.  Id.  
Applying the logic of Zipes, whether a defendant meets the statutory definition of an 
“employer” under Title VII, or any other statutory definition, cannot be a 
jurisdictional issue.  See Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393-94. 
 228 As noted earlier, the logic in Scarfo can be, and has been, applied to cases 
brought under a broad panoply of federal statutes. See supra Part II.C.  Suits brought 
under Title VII, as well as under the FMLA, ADEA, ADA, and EMTALA have all 
required discussion on the application of the “intertwined with the merits” 
exception. 
 229 29 U.S.C. § 630 (2001); 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2001).  See, e.g., Hukill, 192 F.3d 437 
(noting that the threshold number of employees necessary to satisfy the definition of 
an employer under the FMLA is jurisdictional); Rogers v. Sugar Tree Prods., Inc., 7 
F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 1993) (treating the “employer” requirement of the ADEA as an 
element of subject matter jurisdiction). 
 230 Courts do not actually state that these issues are “purely jurisdictional” 
although this is the logical effect of not treating them as intertwined with the merits 
of the case.  See supra Part II.C.  If these issues were truly jurisdictional, a number of 
things would follow: courts, including courts of appeals, would be obligated to raise 
these issues sua sponte; parties—even a losing plaintiff—could raise these issues for 
the first time on appeal; and, parties could not waive these issues by failing to raise 
them, or by mere argument.  See 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, at 12-36.  Additionally, 
a “dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a judgment on the merits, 
and it therefore has no claim preclusive or res judicata effect.”  Id.  Finally, if these 
issues were “purely jurisdictional” they would not apply in state court.  See infra notes 
235-39 and accompanying text. 
 231 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2001). 
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by Bell v. Hood—essentially Rule 12(b)(1) could be used to dismiss 
frivolous or pre-textual federal claims.232  In contrast, when § 1332233 is 
the basis for subject matter jurisdiction, the court may determine the 
citizenship requirement as a pure jurisdictional fact. 
This solution, however, is problematic.  Dividing possible claims 
into § 1331 and § 1332 categories ignores the possibility of cases 
brought under statutes having their own specialized grant of 
jurisdiction.  Thus, the same issues would arise—whether any of the 
statutory requirements are purely jurisdictional or intertwined with 
the merits of the case—and the potential for inconsistencies would 
still be great.  In addition, courts normally do not decide the amount 
in controversy requirement of § 1332 as a jurisdictional fact because it 
is intertwined with the merits of the case; thus, the only way to see if 
the amount is met is to try the claim.234 
A more effective approach would be to ask whether the 
requirement in question would apply even if the action were filed in 
state court.  If the requirement still applies, then it cannot be a purely 
jurisdictional requirement.  If, however, the requirement does not 
apply, then it can be treated as a purely jurisdictional fact to be 
decided by the court.  For example, regardless of where a plaintiff 
files a Title VII claim, be it in state court or federal court,235 the 
plaintiff has no claim unless she can establish that the defendant has 
the requisite number of employees to bring it within the statutory 
definition of “employer.”236  In contrast, a plaintiff does not have to 
prove that the defendants are diverse when filing in state court; it 
 
 232 See Bell, 327 U.S. at 682-83. 
 233 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2001). 
 234 The amount claimed is “deemed to be made in good faith so long as it is not 
clear to a legal certainty that the claimant could not recover a judgment exceeding 
the jurisdictional amount.”  5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1350, at 231; see also 
St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938) (stating that the 
amount claimed by the plaintiff controls as long as it appears to have been made in 
good faith; only if it can be determined to a legal certainty from the face of the 
pleading that there can be no recovery of the jurisdictional amount will the plaintiff’s 
claim be dismissed). 
When the court decides the amount in controversy, it is inherently deciding the 
amount of damages to be awarded.  This is because to decide as fact what is in 
controversy implicates both the substantive law of the claim and what is allowed in 
terms of damages by that particular substantive law.  Thus, the inquiries themselves 
are linked and overlap in a manner sufficient to draw the analogy that the 
determination of the amount in controversy requirement is intertwined with the 
merits of the plaintiff’s case. 
 235 See Yellow Freight Sys. Inc., v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990) (holding that 
federal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over Title VII actions). 
 236 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2001). 
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must do so only when seeking to adjudicate state law claims in federal 
court.237 
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges the authority of a federal 
court to hear the action brought before it.238  Therefore, in the 
majority of cases involving Rule 12(b)(1) motions, it follows that a 
state court should have jurisdiction over the action.  For instance, in 
Scarfo the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction because the statutory fifteen-employee 
requirement was not met.239  The determination of the court, 
however, that Scarfo did not have a Title VII claim would have in 
theory precluded her from succeeding in state court as well.  Thus, 
the fifteen-employee requirement is not a jurisdictional fact 
pertaining to the jurisdiction of the federal court. 
In determining whether a jurisdictional fact is “intertwined with 
the merits” of the case, the best approach is to consider whether that 
fact would have the same import in state as in federal court.  If the 
fact at issue is relevant to the plaintiff’s cause of action only if the 
plaintiff is in federal court, then the jurisdictional fact pertains to the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.  In such a situation, 
the application of Rule 12(b)(1) is proper.  If, however, the fact at 
issue is relevant to the plaintiff’s cause of action in both federal and 
state court, it is necessarily “intertwined with the merits” of the claim.  
In such a case, the application of Rule 12(b)(1) is improper and 
infringes upon a plaintiff’s right to a trial by jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Currently, the federal courts are inconsistently applying the 
“intertwined with the merits” exception to Rule 12(b)(1).  When 
faced with a federal statute such as Title VII, which has its own 
threshold requirements for applicability, federal courts are doing one 
of two things.  They are either holding that statutory requirements 
are jurisdictional issues to be decided by the court, or that statutory 
requirements are intertwined with the merits of the case, and as such 
cannot be decided by the court.  Consequently, this inconsistent 
approach means that while some plaintiffs are given the opportunity 
to exercise their right to a trial by jury, others are being deprived of 
that same right. 
The result in Scarfo and related cases compels the conclusion 
 
 237 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2001). 
 238 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1350, at 194. 
 239 Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 961. 
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that the federal courts must both re-visit and unify their approach to 
Rule 12(b)(1) and the “intertwined with the merits” exception.  As 
the name suggests, a pure jurisdictional fact, which is determinative 
of federal jurisdiction, should be relevant only in federal court.  Until 
the federal courts consistently apply this principle, the plaintiff’s right 
to a jury trial is in serious jeopardy. 
